Air Power's Gap Insurance
Sydney Morning Herald
Wednesday March 3, 2004
Befitting Australia's biggest-ever defence purchase, the F-35 jet fighter was controversy-bound from its birth as an eight-nation joint venture dominated by the United States but including $300 million of Australian participation and expertise. There are the obvious concerns. Will Australia get value for money if and when it hands over between $12 billion and $15 billion for 100 of the so-called Joint Strike Fighters? Will the aircraft's capabilities neatly fit strategic needs specific to Australia? Was selection of the F-35 rushed and, if so, does that reflect a craven defence procurement philosophy intended to satisfy Australia's biggest military ally?
These important considerations have generated compelling argument on both sides of a hot debate. One view holds that the F-35, due to enter RAAF service in eight years, will lack the range and payload of the F-111, due to be phased out in 2010 after nearly 40 years of RAAF service. These critics say weakening strike capability will mean the abandonment of air power as the cornerstone of Australian defence. Equally emphatically, the RAAF extols the F-35 potential and argues that critics miss the significance of in-flight refuelling and other ``enabling capabilities" that will extend the Joint Strike Fighter's flexibility.
Another concern over the F-35 project is easier to comprehend. What happens to Australia's ability to protect itself if the phase-out and phase-in clocks get wildly out of sync? What guarantees are there that the F-35 will be delivered on schedule between 2012 and 2015? If delivery is put off for years by cost-overruns or development flaws and the F-111s have been retired on schedule in 2010 and the F/A-18 Hornets fighter jets between 2012 and 2015 does Australia get stuck with a ``capability gap"?
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute says there is a risk. ``It is still a paper plane," says the institute's director, Hugh White. ``It is not yet fully developed and we have a lot of uncertainties about price, performance, delivery and so on." Again, the RAAF does not see a great problem. The F-111s cost $500 million a year to maintain but they will not be mothballed until the shorter-range F/A-18s achieve enhanced capabilities.
The public, however, may take some persuading. It will be comfortable with a purchase of this magnitude only if it is satisfied national security is not being jeopardised, not even for a relatively brief gap.
© 2004 Sydney Morning Herald
